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InTroDucTIon
The Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) is rapidly developing as an important element in international cli-mate policy by providing a cost-effective means of com-
plying with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. Defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM provides for Annex 
I Parties to implement project activities that reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) in non-Annex I Parties, in return 
for certified emission reductions (“CERs”).1 The CERs gener-
ated by such project activities can be used by Annex I Parties 
to help meet their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol 
and can be traded on the inter-
national emissions trading mar-
ket. Article 12 also stresses that 
CDM projects should assist the 
developing country host Par-
ties (non-Annex I Parties) in 
achieving sustainable devel-
opment and in contributing to 
the ultimate objective of the 
United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”).2
There are currently more than 900 registered CDM proj-
ects in forty-nine developing countries, and about another 2,000 
projects in the project registration pipeline. The registered proj-
ects have resulted in 117,394,796 issued CERs.3 The CDM is 
expected to generate more than 2.6 billion CERs, each equiva-
lent to one tonne of carbon dioxide, by the time the first commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012.4
Therefore, the CDM is not only an innovative mechanism 
that builds a bridge over the ‘North/South’ gap in the Kyoto 
Scheme, but it also brings together private economic interests 
and public climate policy by helping to channel private sec-
tor investment toward climate-friendly projects that otherwise 
might not have taken place. A CDM project attracts substantial 
transfers in financial and technological services to developing 
countries while promoting climate protection and diminishing 
the extent of national climate change mitigation in developed 
countries.
Thus, it is crucial that a CDM project delivers real climate 
benefits without causing other environmental damages, and 
therefore upholds environmental integrity. Yet, how to ensure 
the CDM’s environmental integrity is a legal challenge that 
remains. Environmental impacts of the CDM have already led 
buyers of carbon credits to increasingly try to protect them-
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selves from liability for environmental damage caused by GHG 
projects.5
legal challenges
The CDM is unique among the flexibility mechanisms of 
the Kyoto Protocol in that it allows Annex I Parties to increase 
their accumulated caps by obtaining emission credits generated 
by investments in a CDM project in an uncapped, developing 
(non-Annex I) Party. Each CER is an additional carbon tonne 
which will entitle an Annex I, “investor,” Party to an equiva-
lent increase in emissions from its territory, while remaining in 
compliance.6
However, the lack of quan-
titative mitigation commitments 
in CDM host countries and an 
interest in a maximal number 
of CERs resulting from a CDM 
project create incentives for both 
sides, CER-buyers/investors and 
host states, involved in a CDM 
project to inflate the amount of 
CERs claimed.7 Therefore, the 
more successful the CDM is at 
generating CERs, the more an 
Annex I Party can use those CERs to increase its territorial emis-
sions above its cap, and the more important it is that each CER 
corresponds to real, long-term, measurable emission reduction. 
Apparently, with increasing volumes of CERs, the environmen-
tal performance of the entire Kyoto System depends upon the 
environmental performance of the CDM. Environmental per-
formance of the CDM depends on the demonstrated ability of 
the CDM system to support the objective of the UNFCCC: to 
stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at safe 
levels.8 This ability of the CDM, coupled with avoiding other 
environmental damages is usually referred to as “environmental 
integrity.”9
The importance of environmental integrity has been made 
obvious by the 2005 Meeting of the Parties (“MOP”) 1 when 
adopting the Marrakech Accords (now titled Kyoto Rule Book). 
In decision 2/CMP.1, “Principles, nature and scope of the mech-
The long-term, significant 
reduction of GHGs is a 
necessary condition for 
sustainable development.
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anisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Proto-
col,” the Parties emphasize that “environmental integrity is to be 
achieved through sound modalities, rules and guidelines for the 
mechanisms, sound and strong principles and rules governing 
land use, land use change and forestry activities, and a strong 
compliance regime.”10
In this Article, I will try to explore what this passage implies 
for the CDM and attempt to highlight some aspects of the cur-
rent design of the CDM that raise concerns about environmental 
integrity.
DeFInITIon oF  
envIronmenTal InTegrITy
Environmental integrity in general refers to the ability of 
an environmental measure to reach its objective and purpose. It 
therefore relates to the quality of the regime, its instruments, and 
its institutions. In the context of the climate regime, the extent to 
which the means are able to achieve the ultimate objective of the 
UNFCCC, as stated in Article 2, is essential in considering the 
environmental integrity of the entire regime.
With regard to the flexibility mechanisms, environmental 
integrity will depend on their capacity to ensure that the Par-
ties included in Annex I do not exceed their assigned amounts. 
Emissions, reductions, and removals need, therefore, not only 
be quantifiable by using the same standard worldwide, but also 
real, complete, accurate, long-term, environmentally conserva-
tive, comparable, and verifiable.
Particularly in the climate regime, environmental integrity 
is a requirement for the promotion of sustainable development 
by a climate measure. The long-term, significant reduction of 
GHGs is a necessary condition for sustainable development. In 
other words, no development is sustainable if the issue of tack-
ling climate change is left unsolved.
envIronmenTal InTegrITy oF The cDm
In the particular case of the CDM, environmental integrity 
can be defined in a wider and a narrower sense. In its narrower 
(or primary) sense, it is the demonstrated ability to approve proj-
ects and to certify emissions reductions that are real and addi-
tional, for example, reductions that would not have occurred 
in the absence of the project, and to support projects that con-
tribute to long-term reductions in GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere.11 Environmental integrity in a wider (or secondary) 
sense means that other environmental concerns need to be taken 
into account and negative impact avoided. Special concerns in 
this respect relate to biological diversity protection connected to 
land use, land use change, and forestry projects.12 In particular, 
these concerns exist where CO2 sequestration projects (biomass 
or forest sinks) result in large-scale plantations of mono-cultural 
and/or non-indigenous tree species that could pose a threat to, or 
destroy local ecological systems.
some crITIcal aspecTs
aDDitionality anD leakage
One of the key issues for the environmental integrity of 
CDM projects is the additionality of emission reductions or 
removals.13 Article 12(5)(c) of the Kyoto Protocol provides that 
CERs shall be certified if based on reductions that are additional 
to any that would occur in the absence of the project.14 Addi-
tionality is a necessary requirement for making the CDM func-
tion as a mechanism to compensate for emissions that are not 
being reduced domestically by Annex I Parties.15 If CERs are 
created that represent emission reductions that would have hap-
pened anyway, then these “paper reductions” will undermine the 
integrity of the Kyoto Protocol.
Each project participant must demonstrate the additional-
ity of the project in the project design document (“PDD”). Each 
project must describe the baseline scenario from which this 
additionality is measured. This baseline scenario represents the 
GHG emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the 
project. Problematic in this context is the counter-factuality of 
the baseline scenario: the project developer needs to investigate 
what would have happened if the project had not taken place. 
This scenario can lead to hypothetical assumptions, which help 
to inflate the amount of CERs.
To counter such incentives, the project must be based on 
a baseline and monitoring methodology applied to the project 
activity. The Executive Board (“EB”), which is assisted by the 
Panel on Guidelines for Methodologies for Baselines and Moni-
toring Plans (“Meth Panel”), are to approve the methodologies.16 
However, the issue here is whether the EB and/or the Meth Panel 
are adequately equipped to carry out this task. Concerns have 
arisen with respect to the member’s capacity to carry this task 
and to the financial budget available for this kind of work.17
The PDD must further include the project boundary and any 
adjustments for leakage. This means that a project must calculate 
all GHG emissions under the control of the project participants 
that are significant and reasonably attributable to the project 
activity. These must then be adjusted for net changes of green-
house gas emissions outside of the project boundary, which are 
measurable and contributable to the project activity.18
Additionality coupled with prevention of leakage helps to 
address concerns that investments in the CDM could displace, 
rather than replace, GHG-intensive activities. An example of 
such leakage would occur if a CDM project reduced fossil fuels 
where it meant to, but also resulted in increases elsewhere. The 
challenge, however, is how to define “project boundaries” and 
“emissions under the control of the project participant” in this 
context. “Leakage” might easily be detected if it happens in the 
same industrial sector or the same region, however, increases 
can also occur across country borders. These emissions might 
hardly be found to be under the control of the project developer, 
and thus not calculable in the baseline-scenario.
In order to survive an “environmental integrity check,” a 
CDM project would need to prove that its additionality does not 
lead to increased emissions elsewhere or slow climate change 
mitigation efforts. It is within the climate regime that a solution 
to this situation needs to be found. Therefore, the design of the 
CDM has to prevent projects that lead to a net increase in emis-
sions, whether that is in the same sector, in other sectors, in other 
regions of the same country, or in other countries. 
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The additionality criterion in its present state, despite being 
crucial to the environmental integrity of the CDM, can create 
adverse policy incentives to climate change mitigation. The 
potential of CDM projects to generate much-needed investment 
flows into a host country has led some developing countries to 
back off from implementing more progressive energy or climate 
policies and the respective legislation needed. These policies 
and laws, if integrated into the baseline, would disqualify CDM 
projects that aim at meeting these new standards or thresholds 
because they no longer would be additional.19
In order to promote environmental integrity while encour-
aging progressive climate policies in these countries, a solution 
to, and safeguard against, this disturbing situation must be found 
within the climate regime.
contRibution to SuStainable Development
The contribution of the CDM to sustainable development 
needs to be seen in terms of host country development, as 
expressed as one of the CDM goals mentioned above. Given the 
reference to the objective of the Convention and the role that cli-
mate change mitigation itself plays in sustainable development,20 
any assessment of the CDM’s contribution must also recognize 
the wider role projects and the mechanism itself can play as cat-
alysts for sustainable development of host States.21
CDM’s contribution to sustainable development was sub-
ject to considerable debate during the negotiations of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords and is under improvement 
still.22 In particular, host countries have been concerned about 
their sovereignty and largely unwilling to accept externally deter-
mined sustainable development priorities imposed on them.23 
This led to only marginal references to sustainable development 
in the Marrakesh Accords, which leave the meaning of “sustain-
able development” undefined. Rather, under the climate regime, 
it remains the host country’s sovereign prerogative to determine 
whether a particular CDM project helps it achieve this goal.24 
Thus, relatively little is achieved in terms of affecting the growth 
pattern of developing countries.
A project is, in the absence of any alternative, considered 
to contribute to sustainable development if it is congruent with 
existing national development policies.25 This “subjective” 
approach to sustainable development translates into curtailing 
and challenging the potential of the CDM. Though, there are a 
few concerns. 
First, designing the CDM and meeting CDM project eligi-
bility requirements present significant challenges because host 
countries have different economic conditions, natural resources, 
and development priorities. Thus, they have different percep-
tions about what is required to achieve sustainable development. 
Selecting sustainable development criteria and assessing the sus-
tainable development impact can therefore differ significantly 
from one host country to another.
Despite several ideas about quality standards or indicators 
of sustainable development,26 which provide some guidance on 
what should be taken into account, in the end, it is currently the 
host country’s sovereign decision to ascertain whether a CDM 
project activity promotes its sustainable development targets.27 
Therefore, the Designated National Authorities (“DNAs”) in 
developing countries are tasked with issuing a Letter of Approval 
attesting to the project’s contribution to their countries’ sustain-
able development.28 A CDM project can only be registered if 
such affirmation is provided to the CDM Executive Board. This 
leads to uncertainty and creates a disincentive for investment 
decisions.
Second, while there is, without a doubt, a strong potential 
for synergies between addressing environmental problems and 
national development goals,29 there is also the danger that accept-
ing congruency with existing development policies may not lead 
to a change of benefits to sustainable development since most 
existing national development policies lead to increasing GHG 
emissions.30 Thus, the congruency requirement is not a high 
threshold, if any at all, in terms of sustainable development.31
Which Path to Follow?
From the point of sustainable development, a low energy 
path is, most likely, the optimal way.32 However, most devel-
opment paths are likely to lead to increasing energy demands 
and depend on the availability of energy resources to meet these 
demands. It is unrealistic to assume that developing countries, or 
developed countries for that matter, will in the near future change 
to development strategies based on constant or declining levels 
of energy consumption. Energy is fundamental to advancing the 
economic and social dimensions of sustainable development.33 
However, sustainable development requires that, different from 
the scenario outlined in Figure 1, meeting increasing energy 
demand must not go along with increasing CO2 emissions.
FIgure 1: energy-relaTeD co2 emIssIons
34
In 1987, the World Commission of Environment and Devel-
opment (“WCED”) noted that it is essential that demands be met 
by energy sources that are dependable, safe, and environmen-
tally sound.35 In particular the latter, but arguably all three crite-
ria for such “sustainable energy supply,” require the decoupling 
of energy supply from increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
Achieving sustainable development in developing, and 
developed, countries, thus depends on more efficient energy use, 
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reduction of energy consumption, and, importantly, the decar-
bonisation of their economies. Unless the impact of the CDM 
spurs climate-friendly policies in developing countries, it will 
promote only one of the CDM’s triple goals: the cost effective 
compliance of Annex I countries with their emission reduction 
commitments. However, it will not contribute to the ultimate 
objective of the UNFCCC, as it would not assist non-Annex I 
Parties in contributing to stabilizing GHG concentrations, nor 
contribute to the sustainable development of non-Annex I Par-
ties in any meaningful way. 
The question is whether developing countries should be 
accorded a privileged position when considering their sustain-
able development path. The WCED, in promoting the transition 
to a sustainable energy era, suggested that traditional fossil fuel 
use should be accepted in devel-
oping countries in order to real-
ize their growth potential, while 
developed countries should seek 
to limit their uses of fossil fuel.36 
This recommendation is prob-
lematic. Sustainable develop-
ment does not require increased 
fossil fuel consumption in devel-
oping countries. What it requires 
are equal development oppor-
tunities, however, these depend 
on the availability of energy resources in general, and not only 
fossil fuels. To grant developing countries a preferential “right” 
to use fossil fuels would also burden them with an obligation 
to reduce emissions. Rather, sustainable development requires 
avoiding such a burden from the outset.
Sustainable development in developing countries means 
enabling them to achieve higher levels of economic develop-
ment with much reduced levels of greenhouse gas emissions and 
environmental damage. Copying the negative example of indus-
trialized nations is certainly not sustainable.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out the 
inconvenient truth that, “energy security cannot be achieved 
without recognition of the environmental consequences of 
energy consumption, ‘especially our currently overwhelm-
ing and deeply entrenched reliance on fossil fuels.’”37 He said 
“the need to increase energy supplies in order to fight poverty 
could entail a vicious circle but added that this does not need to 
happen” because energy supplies do not depend on fossil fuels 
only.38
In order to move toward sustainable development, develop-
ing countries also must systematically decrease the carbon inten-
sity of their economic development through renewable energy 
systems, enhanced energy efficiency, and introduction of clean 
technologies, with the financial and technological assistance of 
industrialized countries. Thus, with respect to developing coun-
tries, the purpose of the CDM can be understood as assisting in 
the transformation of their economies. Therefore, the CDM is a 
crucially important global financial vehicle to catalyze national 
transitions toward sustainable development in host countries 
by increasing “green investment” flows into energy supplies, 
transportation, and other industrial sectors.39 In this sense, it 
is evident, as the acting head of the UN Climate Change Sec-
retariat stated, “that the Kyoto Protocol is making a significant 
contribution towards sustainable development of developing 
countries.”40
Reality
The reality of CDM projects has so far been quite different 
from their initial conception.41 As has been noted, almost all pro-
posed and approved projects to date have primarily focused on 
maximizing the generation of CERs instead of focusing on sus-
tainable development.42 Thus, three contentious issues related to 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (“CCS”), HFC-23 projects, 
and forest conservation, arose.43
First, including CCS proj-
ects aimed at capturing CO2 
emissions from industrial 
sources and subsequently stor-
ing the gas underground or in 
the sub-seabed of the oceans in 
the scope of the CDM raises not 
only complicated technological 
questions with regard to ensur-
ing permanence and monitor-
ing, but also legal questions as 
to whether the injection of CO2 
in geological formations should count as a non-emission, emis-
sion reduction, or carbon sequestration.44 It also raises more 
fundamental points as to the contribution to sustainable develop-
ment of such projects. Critics allege that this kind of technologi-
cal advance channels substantial research and development into 
end-of-pipe technological fixes without contributing to long-
term benefits to low-carbon intensive technological develop-
ment. Though in fact, it might actually delay the transition from 
fossil fuels to more sustainable energy systems.45 The Member 
States of the Kyoto Protocol confirmed that 
carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological for-
mations should lead to the transfer of environmentally 
safe and sound technology and know-how, Noting that 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special 
report on carbon dioxide capture and storage provides 
a comprehensive assessment of the scientific, technical, 
environmental, economic and social aspects of carbon 
dioxide capture and storage technologies as mitigation 
options.46
However, it was also recognized that “there remain a num-
ber of unresolved technical, methodological, legal and policy 
issues relating to carbon dioxide capture and storage activities 
under the clean development mechanism” and “that there is a 
need for capacity-building on carbon dioxide capture and stor-
age technologies and their applications.”47 It is therefore timely 
and necessary to place a wider assessment of CCS and sustain-
able development on the research agendas.
Second, another challenge to the promotion of sustainable 
development by the CDM concerns the proposed inclusion of 
The reality of CDM 
projects has so far been 
quite different from their 
initial conception.
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HFC-23 projects. HFC-23, a greenhouse gas listed in Annex 
A of the Kyoto Protocol, is a by-product in the production of 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC-22), an ozone-depleting gas 
regulated under the Montreal Protocol. Incineration of HFC-23 
at existing production sites is already an accepted and practiced 
CDM project, generating low cost CERs ($0.50 per tonne of CO2 
equiv.). Expanding the scope of CDM projects to new incin-
eration sites could create the perverse incentive to increase the 
production of HCFC-22 to generate larger amounts of HFC-23. 
Sustainable development is further undermined by the fact that 
HFC-23 projects provide no technology transfer to develop-
ing countries and the low cost CERs from these projects could 
actually lead to outpacing other high-quality projects. Again, no 
final decision has been taken on this issue and the MOP1 asked 
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(“SBSTA”) for further elabora-
tions.48 Also, it is recommended 
that the discussions around this 
issue seriously consider the 
impacts on sustainable devel-
opment due to the extension of 
such projects.
Third, one of the major 
omissions of the current design 
of the climate regime is a plan 
for reducing emissions from 
deforestation in developing 
countries and accounting for-
est conservation activities. A proposal by Papua New Guinea 
and Costa Rica submitted to the 11th Conference of Parties 
(“COP”)/MOP1 in 2005 seeks to include forest conservation 
activities under the CDM or, alternatively, suggests elaborating 
an optional Protocol to the Climate Convention. Yet, at COP13/
MOP3 held in Bali, there was still no final decision made regard-
ing the role for avoided deforestation in the CDM. Thus, for-
est conservation, avoided deforestation, and accounting for both 
will be dealt with as part of the post-2012 package. Still, the 
inclusion of forest conservation projects could bring about the 
win-win situation envisaged by sustainable development, where 
economic value is attached to the protection of ecological assets. 
For developing countries, CDM benefits from “avoided defores-
tation” could bring about social and economic improvements via 
the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, in this case 
ones not directly linked to the project, as well as wider environ-
mental benefits, such as biodiversity protection.
Safeguards
Sustainable development must be clearly defined, and seri-
ously and actively pursued through the CDM. Ensuring the integ-
rity of the CDM with regard to the sustainable development paths 
of host countries, demands strong safeguards. However, no such 
safeguards exist for ensuring sustainable development. Despite 
the above-proposed relatively straightforward definition of sus-
tainable development in a climate context, for example, where 
economic growth is decoupled from GHG emission growth, the 
climate regime has yet to embrace this understanding.
To meet the requirements of sustainability, a CDM project 
with adverse trade ramifications will need to demonstrate an 
ability to overcome the still existing obstacles and shortcomings 
of the Kyoto/Marrakech system.
The legal review of CDM projects, whether it takes place 
under the compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol,49 an inter-
national arbitral tribunal,50 or the WTO Dispute System, will 
supposedly establish a definition of sustainable development 
requirements under the CDM. Regardless, it is important that 
climate law and practice construe a coherent understanding of 
sustainable development. While searching for the conceptual-
ization and definition of sustainable development as an external 
tributary into international climate law, the converse normative 
flow might be at least as valid and probable, and perhaps more 
significant in the long run.51
If sustainable development 
is to be seriously pursued, CDM 
projects will need to go beyond 
more immediate impacts and 
provide “long-term benefits” as 
required by Article 12(5) of the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, those 
immediate benefits are equally 
necessary. No long-term bene-
fits can be attributed to the CDM 
if it does not lead to real, mea-
surable, and additional emission 
reductions.52
The benefits generated by CDM projects may lessen reli-
ance on carbon-intensive development. An analysis of sustain-
able development benefits accruing from CDM projects has 
identified the following advantageous impacts: direct financial 
incentives for proving the competitiveness of new technologies 
for energy reduction, renewable energy generation, and increase 
of energy efficiency, such as sustainable energy technologies; 
development of supporting policy initiatives; increased under-
standing and acceptance of the importance and application of 
sustainable energy technologies; dissemination of best-practice 
techniques; strengthening of local institutional, financial and 
technological capacity; increased and sustainable foreign invest-
ment; and increased access to sustainable energy services.53
Arguably, the most sophisticated analytical methodology 
for identifying sustainable CDM projects is the proposed Gold 
Standard, though other approaches exist.54 The Gold Standard 
aims to ensure that CDM projects deliver real emissions reduc-
tions and clear contributions to sustainable development. The 
criteria established are divided into three screens: the project 
type, additionality and baselines, and sustainable development. 
In regards to the latter particularly, the Gold Standard creates 
a sustainability matrix, in addition to an environmental impact 
assessment and stakeholder consultation. The matrix aims at 
assessing a project’s contribution to sustainable development 
based on its environmental, social, and economic impacts.55 The 
key variables are assessed on the basis of on-site measurement, 
existing data, and stakeholder consultation, and can score nega-
The benefits generated 
by CDM projects may 
lessen reliance on carbon-
intensive development.
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tive or positive. If the overall contribution is positive and non-
negative in all key components, then a project is considered as 
contributing to sustainable development.
While the Gold Standard certainly is laudable, its success 
will depend on its acceptance by project developers, host and 
investor countries, and the multilateral climate regime, particu-
larly the Executive Board. So far, it has acquired a closer and 
more specific understanding of sustainable development. The 
Gold Standard, together with other approaches to identifying 
“sustainable” CDM projects,56 helps to clarify the substance of 
sustainable development not only in the particular context of 
CDM projects, but also beyond this mechanism. The identified 
criteria and components, if they are accepted and used to guide 
further project development, would reflect the understanding of 
the international community, both North and South, of sustain-
able development. This understanding could be decisive if com-
pliance with WTO norms were at stake.
pRoceDuRalS
Additionally, procedural safeguards of direct contribu-
tion of CDM projects to sustainable development in develop-
ing countries, more specific requirements on sustainable impact 
assessment, public consultation and participation, and benefit 
sharing57 have yet to be included in the CDM regime.58
Impact Assessment
As with the response to sustainable development indicators, 
the idea of a mandatory environmental and sustainable impact 
assessment for all CDM projects was seen as an infringement on 
the sovereignty of potential host States. As a result, the final lan-
guage of the agreement is weak, requiring nothing more than an 
analysis of environmental impacts only if the host country makes 
it mandatory for the project to be approved.59 The CDM Modali-
ties and Procedures do not provide for a situation where the host 
country does not have any laws on environmental impact assess-
ment. However, if stakeholders have concerns about the local 
environment or the social impact of a CDM project, then the 
project should be evaluated under the highest international envi-
ronmental and social assessment procedures and standards.60
However, the more stringent the rules on environmental and 
sustainable impact assessment are, the more costly CDM proj-
ects might become. Since a host country benefits from a CDM 
project, the absence of harmonized international rules may cre-
ate an incentive for the host country to refrain from insisting on 
a thorough impact assessment, in order to make its own market 
attractive for CDM projects. “The CDM’s geographical flexibil-
ity,” warn Meijer and Werksman, “should not become a means 
of channelling projects to host countries with the lowest envi-
ronmental standard.”61
Internationally harmonized rules on environmental and 
sustainable impact assessment of a CDM project would counter 
such a perverse incentive. In order for a CDM project to pass a 
sustainability test, they might, indeed, be necessary. Still, such a 
test would evaluate the circumstances of a particular CDM proj-
ect. In this case, it needs to be shown that the environmental and 
sustainable impacts were thoroughly assessed.
Public Participation
Involvement of stakeholders, defined as “the public, includ-
ing individuals, groups or communities affected or likely to be 
affected” by the CDM project,62 gives an opportunity to a wider 
circle to comment on CDM projects at various stages of the proj-
ect cycle. The modalities of the CDM require certain types of 
information to be made public. Public participation could lead 
to benefits in regards to environmental integrity and sustainable 
development. Local communities and NGOs could influence 
project design as their knowledge of local conditions might be 
of particular value, thus making it easier for project developers 
to recognize community needs and gain public support, and to 
avoid delays, financial risks, local unrest, or legal action. 
So far, stakeholder involvement requirements are only of a 
procedural character. Comments from the public must be invited 
and compiled and form an official input as part of the validation 
and registration process of a project. However, the concerns of 
stakeholders are not required to be substantially reflected in the 
project development. Again, these restrictions on direct public 
involvement resulted from the unwillingness of countries with 
different approaches to public participation to agree on harmo-
nized standards.63
However, the requirements of environmental integrity and 
sustainable development may demand a stronger commitment 
to stricter and harmonized standards for and more direct influ-
ence of public involvement.64 The reference to international 
standards for public participation would prevent a “race to the 
bottom” toward countries with low or no regulation on public 
involvement.
in Sum
Despite the fact that it is the stated goal of the CDM to 
achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and to assist non-
Annex I countries in developing sustainability, the present regu-
latory framework remains somewhat rudimentary in setting up 
and standardizing essential substantial and procedural require-
ments for meeting these goals. Therefore, the rather pragmatic 
and fragmented approach taken so far to ensure the CDM’s envi-
ronmental and sustainable integrity will need to be replaced by a 
stronger, harmonized regulatory framework. 
conclusIon
Whether the CDM will provide a basis for future multi-
lateral climate policy depends on the willingness of nations to 
commit themselves to the deeper emission cuts that, as scientific 
evidence suggests, are necessary.65 Discussions about the CDM 
during the negotiations of COP13/MOP3 in Bali in December 
2007 signified the considerable potential of the CDM to bring 
about consensus on the terms of global climate policy at some 
point in the future.
UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, noted at this 
event:
The CDM has been the focus of intense scrutiny, and 
rightly so, by those who wish to ensure the mecha-
nism’s environmental integrity and contribution to 
sustainable development, as well by those who want 
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to ensure cost effectiveness. The conclusion that we 
can draw, looking back from this milestone, is that the 
CDM is delivering what it was meant to deliver—emis-
sion reductions and development. What’s more, it has 
shown that it can evolve, adapt and improve.66
This positive conclusion will also be subject to scrutiny 
and criticism in the future. Despite the achievements, much still 
needs to be done in order to secure sound environmental out-
comes of the CDM.
Whether the CDM is going to play an important role in any 
post-2012 agreement will depend on the CDM’s ability to meet 
its triple goals: to assist non-Annex I Parties in achieving sus-
tainable development, to contribute to the ultimate objective of 
the Convention, and to help Parties included in Annex I achieve 
compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduc-
tion commitments.67
Still, the increasing interest in the CDM has spread to non-
Kyoto countries as well. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive of seven U.S. states, for example, envisages a cap-and-trade 
system to be in place by 2009. The plants covered by the scheme 
will presumably be allowed to use “offset credits,” emissions 
reductions achieved outside the electricity sector. Such credits 
could be “born in the USA” following similar rules as those 
from projects generating emissions reduction under the CDM. 
However, the plan envisages that under certain conditions, they 
may also stem directly from CDM projects. 
The implications for the environmental integrity of the CDM 
should non-Kyoto Parties be allowed to receive CERs are yet to 
be assessed. While the interest in the CDM is steadily increas-
ing, so are the challenges to ensuring its environmental integrity 
and its contribution to sustainable development.
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